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Karl Marx’s Capital was and continues to be regarded as a monumental effort in the 
history of economic theory. Indeed, Marx’s stated aim in writing his “Critique of Political 
Economy,” as disclosed in the 1867 Preface to Volume 1, was to elucidate the “laws of motion 
of capital” that, as he maintained, the classical political economists either misunderstood or 
(unconsciously, though, in other instances, consciously) misrepresented – and that the experience 
of living within the capitalist mode of production itself obscured. Yet while his textual 
conversation with Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and their disciples has been carefully scrutinized to 
the last detail, the role that Marx attributes to the “laws” in the production of their own 
mystification has received significantly less attention, an oversight that, in turn, has blurred the 
extent to which Capital is laden with a theory of ideology that is just as robust as its primary 
analysis of economic categories. In his presentation of the so-called “Trinity Formula” in 
Volume 3, Marx states, in effect, the outline of this theory of ideology: 
 
Vulgar economics actually does nothing more than interpret, systematize and turn into apologetics the 
notions of agents trapped within bourgeois relations of production. So it should not surprise us that 
precisely in the estranged form of appearance of economic relations [die entfremdete Erscheinungsform 
der ökonomischen Verhältnisse] that involves these prima facie absurd and complete contradictions – and 
all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their essence –  
that precisely here vulgar economics feels completely at home, these relationships appearing all the more 
self-evident to it, the more their inner connections remain hidden, even though they [the forms] are 
comprehensible to the popular mind. [Emphasis added.]1 
 
In unpacking this passage, which, despite its importance, is included only in the closing 
chapters of Capital’s last (unfinished) Volume, there surfaces a particularly radical conception of 
                                                        
1 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 3, trans. by David Fernbach (New York: Penguin 





the “concealment” of capitalist social relations, insofar as Marx asserts that the concealment he is 
targeting in his analysis is not imposed externally, but rather is part and parcel of the proper 
functioning and form of these relations themselves. “Vulgar economics,” and the vulgar 
economists who in a doctrinaire fashion peddle its doctrines, is not “vulgar” because it fashions a 
mask for the capitalist system that is ultimately foreign or inapplicable to the system’s “essence.” 
Rather, for Marx, the mistake of the vulgar economists is that they take capitalism at its word, so 
to speak; vulgar economy “interprets” and “systematizes” what the agents of production within 
the capitalist edifice already take to be self-evident from their own relationship to the capitalist 
world economy, translating day-to-day experiences into truisms that “are comprehensible to the 
popular mind.” Ideology, that is, is a self-concealment of a social reality that is inseparable from 
that reality’s “normalcy.” The mental constructs formed by those ensconced within this reality 
(the aforementioned “agents of production”) serve not to elucidate the significance behind their 
actions, nor the historicity and social nature of their actions, but rather to ensure that their 
perceptions of their own actions are in line with the necessities of the system that these actions 
perpetuate. The task of Capital, and of a “scientific” analysis of capitalism in general, is thus 
revealed as being three-fold. In addition to bridging the gap between “the outward appearance 
and the essence of things,” the social scientist must explain the reason for that incongruence. 
Finally, he or she must determine what purpose the incongruence fulfills. 
This conception of “concealment” is notably distinct from a commonly-supposed 
“Marxian” definition of ideology, which takes as its point of departure Marx’s treatment of the 
necessities of societal superstructures in The German Ideology. In this interpretation, ideological 
formations constitute a “false” picture of reality that is actively foisted upon the lower 





stature.2 Ideology, as such, is a veil that is accommodated to a socially-constructed reality but not 
an inherent part of it, one that is preserved and promoted by a collection of agents that is fully 
conscious of its falsity. While the theory that I claim is immanent to Capital does not entirely 
discount the existence of such a “false picture,” the portrait that it paints is far more complex - 
and, arguably, more sinister. The illusions by which the capitalist edifice naturalizes itself in the 
minds of its inhabitants are not a “veil” of reality, but that reality itself. The “appearance,” in 
other words, necessarily emerges from the “essence.” Marx is even stronger on this point: the 
appearance is what “activates” the functioning of the “essence of things” and what, as a result, 
allows the social imperatives implied by this essence (the “laws of motion” of capital) to assert 
themselves in actuality. In a society in which the sum processes of social production are carried 
out by property-owning individuals (or corporate bodies) independent of one another, to take an 
example, the form that the products of labor must assume is the commodity-form. The 
accompanying fetish (to use Marx’s term, elaborated on below) of the commodity-form, hence, 
cannot be theorized out of existence. The analysis of Capital can only deduce the specific social 
conditions by which this mystification (and others related to it) obtains. 
Though I have highlighted Marx’s comments on the “Trinity Formula,” this is hardly the 
only instance of that which I have hitherto labelled as an incipient theory of ideology.3 
Throughout the course of the three Volumes of Capital, Marx regards each of his discoveries as 
“the solving of a mystery,” “the discovery of a secret,” “the unfurling of a riddle,” etc., 
                                                        
2 Recall the pithy formulation found in the Manifesto of the Communist Party: “The ruling ideas of each age have 
been the ideas of its ruling class.” 
3 The commentary on the “Trinity Formula” is, in several respects, the culmination of all of Marx’s earlier 
descriptions of capitalist-specific fetishistic illusions. From the already-excerpted quote, Marx continues: “[In] this 
economic trinity… completes the mystification of the capitalist mode of production, the reification of social 
relations, and the immediate coalescence of the material relations of production with their historical and social 
specificity: the bewitched, distorted and upside-down world haunted by Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre, 





accompanying his description of the commodity-form, the money-form, the origin of surplus-
value, the tendency toward a wider division of labor, the impetus for mechanization, “revolutions 
in the production process,” etc., with the concealment that each of them impresses upon the 
minds of the agents of production (and that, unsurprisingly, the vulgar economists reiterate). 
These instances of concealment, however, all share a similar structure. They consist in the 
attribution to a form of appearance, which exists and is sustained by a specific set of social 
relations, of natural properties that are, in fact, social. The relations that underpin these forms of 
appearance are thereby shrouded, while the forms themselves are fetishistically taken to be 
things that, by their own (supra-historic) design, possess socially-directive traits. Nonetheless, 
the fetishisms are concordant with the way the forms present themselves to those who “are 
trapped,” or find themselves positioned, in these mystifying social relations. They are, so to 
speak, objective illusions. Though their illusory character can be divulged through the work of 
the analyst, the misleading appearance of these forms can only be removed by the restructuring 
the ensemble of social relations of which they are ultimately a reflection. 
An adequate comparison to the “objective illusions” in Capital, as well as a useful point 
of reference, is the Kantian conception of a “transcendental illusion.” In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant, while introducing the “Concepts of Pure Reason,” makes a critical distinction 
between what he calls “logical illusions [logische Scheine]” and “transcendental illusions 
[transzendentale Scheine].”4 For Kant, logical illusions originate from a misapplication of the 
faculty of reasoning, which results in a false apprehension of reality. Once this “attentiveness to 
                                                        
4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 386. Marx, too, uses the German word “Schein” when referring to the objective 






the logical rule” is refocused, the logical illusion “entirely disappears.”5 The transcendental 
illusion, by contrast, is a deceptive portrait of reality that is rooted in the “fundamental rules and 
maxims” of the faculty of reason, from which reason simply cannot suitably remove itself.6 This 
category of illusions is intrinsic to the very fabric of reasoning: “What we have to do here is with 
a natural and unavoidable [type of] illusion which itself rests on subjective reasons and passes 
them off as objective….”7 Kant assuages his readers by informing them that his exposition on the 
“transcendental dialectic” will be able to “uncover the illusion[s]… while at the same time 
protecting us [him and his readers] from being deceived by [them],” but he adds that such an 
uncovering will not and cannot “bring… about that transcendental illusions… cease to be 
illusion[s].”8 The parallels between what I have described as Marx’s objective illusions and 
Kant’s transcendental illusions are striking. Both involve a categorical confusion on the part of 
the subject (natural instead of social, objective instead of subjective), and both can be understood 
but not abolished by critical inquiry. The dividing line between the two, however, is the site of 
origin of these illusions. Marx’s objective illusions emanate from the structure of the social 
world the subject inhabits. Kant’s transcendental illusions are reproduced within the subject. For 
this reason, objective illusions can in theory be dispelled by a restructuring of the social world, 
while transcendental ones obtain under any societal arrangement. 
In this thesis, then, I will endeavor to selectively reconstruct the argument of the first six 
chapters of Volume 1 of Capital, which cover Marx’s analysis of the commodity as the 
“elementary form” of capitalist society all the way to his unveiling of the origin of capitalist 
                                                        
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 






profit in the exploitation of labor-power, in order to (i) highlight specific and important instances 
in which his theory of socially objective illusions comes into play, (ii) examine the social 
scientific method that Marx employs over the course of these sections, and (iii) draw out the 
connection between the method and the excavation of the “fetishisms” that, as I will contend, are 
deeply interrelated. My claim, as such, is not just that Marx himself held this sophisticated 
“theory of ideology” to be true, but that the methodology of Capital is what permitted him to 
detect and, to borrow Kant’s phrase, “not be deceived” by the ideological mantle that is 
constituted by the necessary illusory “appearances” of social and economic phenomena under the 
regime of capital. I will, moreover, discuss whether such a method is suitable only to investigate 
capitalist social formations, or whether Marx’s approach is applicable to all historic economic 
structures. (Is there something specific to the capitalist mode of production that renders the task 
of the analyst more difficult than, say, the “feudal” mode of production?) I have chosen this set 
of chapters in particular because in them the operation and uniqueness of Marx’s dialectical 
method is most clearly visible, in addition to the fact that the results of these six chapters form 
the foundation of the rest of Capital’s comprehensive critique.  
My hope is that such a project can enrich future readings of Marx’s opus, as well as 
inform a sharper evaluation of the text’s tentative conclusions. More broadly, if this project is 
successful, the theory of ideology in Capital could potentially provide new parameters for the 
scientific analysis of all social systems. (To what extent are political formations pregnant with 
instances of “concealment” that are inseparable to their functioning? What “fetishes” accompany 
the “imagined community” of the nation-state, for instance?) After all, as the 1872 Preface to 





fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits.”9 
 
Part I: The Commodity-Form and Value 
 
 
The Commodity as the “Elementary Form” 
 
 
 Marx inaugurates Volume 1 of Capital by establishing the commodity as the “elementary 
form” of the capitalist system:  
 
The wealth of all societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an “immense 
collection of commodities”; the individual commodity appears as its elementary form. Our investigation 
therefore begins with the analysis of the commodity. [Emphasis added]10 
 
 Already the wording of this introductory excerpt reveals a certain injunction regarding 
Marx’s choice of the commodity as the starting point of his analysis. Twice he refers to the 
commodity as an “appearance,” first (in the aggregate) of the “wealth” of any and all capitalist 
societies, then as the basic unit by which this wealth is measured. His inquiry of the capitalist 
system thereby commences by an investigation of a form of presentation that is universally 
acknowledged by the inhabitants of a society “in which the capitalist mode of production 
prevails.” There are no claims in this opening passage as to what is, only what appears; Marx’s 
implicit claim here is that a proper understanding of the former can only be obtained through a 
thorough grasp of the latter.  
 
                                                        
9 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, trans. by Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1992), 104. 





 Indeed, as he goes on to examine the “two factors” of the commodity-form, Marx 
confronts a second representation that is ubiquitous to capitalism’s “agents of production” but 
the source of which is largely unknown to the same. This is the universal exchangeability of the 
multifaceted commodity, multifaceted, he notes, insofar as the commodity is a “thing… [that] 
satisfies human needs of whatever kind.”11 That the commodity is in part a use-value is an easily 
accepted fact, as use-values have “constitute[d] the material content of wealth” in all historical 
social bodies.12 What is unique to the commodity as a form that is representative of capitalist 
wealth is that any commodity is simultaneously a use-value, differentiated from other 
commodities by its particular qualities, and the “material beare[r] of… exchange-value,” a 
property that is independent of the commodity’s usefulness.13 This universal property, which pre-
capitalist embodiments of use-value did not have (or at least not at the scale that they do in 
capitalist society), manifests itself in a “quantitative relation… that changes constantly with time 
and place,” a reference to the fluctuation of prices, rates of exchange, and so forth that are 
endemic to the exchange of commodities under the capitalist system.  
 
Exchange-value “hence appears to be something accidental and purely relative,” which 
renders its qualification as “an intrinsic [property] that is inseparably connected with the 
commodity… a contradiction in terms.”14 The economists’ attempt to explicate the magnitude of 
these quantitative relationships (prices) by movements in aggregate demand and supply fail to 
resolve the question of why commodities, which are so qualitatively diverse, are exchangeable in 
the first place; why they are the “bearers” of a property that places them into relationships that 
                                                        
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Capital Vol. 1, 126. 





precisely ignore this diversity, being, as they are, purely quantitative. Mystified by this 
exchangeability, the vulgarists and the agents of production themselves are thus led to attribute 
exchange-value to the commodity (the thing itself) rather than the social context in which the 
commodity-form arises, in effect “fetishizing” the unit of wealth.  Marx, by contrast, is resolved 
to explain the seeming contradiction between use- and exchange-value by probing into the 
configuration of the relationship that commodities are placed in during the process of exchange. 
What he will eventually conclude is that “exchange-value,” being expressed precisely through 
the placing of commodities in a historically specific social relationship (exchange amongst 
independent producers), “[is] the necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance, of” a 
socially objective characteristic, a society-regulating real abstraction: “value.”15 
 
For Marx, the resolution to the conundrum between use- and exchange-value, between 
the heterogeneity in human needs and the homogeneity in quantitative exchange, is the presence 
of a third property in commodities that countenances their equivalence. Famously, his proposal 
is that this property is value, as measured by labor time; that is, the fact that all use-values are 
created by the expenditure of human labor-power: “If then we disregard the use-value of 
commodities, only one property remains, that of being products of labor.”16 The 
commensurability of commodities arises, therefore, from their common origin as the endpoint of 
a production process undertaken by individuals (or groups of individuals) that are consciously 
striving to transform a set of materials into a product that fulfils a human necessity (i.e., a use-
value). The relative ratios at which these products exchange are proportional to the quantity of 
human labor embodied in their respective production processes. As Marx himself acknowledges 
                                                        
15 Ibid. 





later on in Chapter 1, his “labor theory of value” is inspired by the writings of the “best [i.e., 
scientific, as opposed to vulgar] representatives of classical political economy,” by which he is 
referring to Smith and Ricardo.17  
 
Yet while this may at first glance resolve the conundrum between use- and exchange-
value, labor, too, has a “dual character” that presents difficulties in reconciling the universal 
exchangeability of commodities with the qualitative multiplicity of their use-values. For labor to 
be the “substance of value,” this labor must be “equal human labor, the expenditure of identical 
human labor-power.”18 However, the multiplicity of forms of use-value that are exchanged in the 
marketplace indicate that the labor undertaken in their production is qualitatively different. In 
this sense, the problem of particularity and universality embodied in the categories of use- and 
exchange-value is reproduced in the articulation of the concept of “value.” (This is why Marx 
suggests that a further examination of the form of exchange-value, “which stamps value,” must 
be deferred in favor of a closer examination of the “characteristics we have already found 
somewhat more fully.”19) Labor is both concrete and abstract: concrete, insofar as any given 
labor process necessitates a specific expenditure of human nerves, muscles, etc., and abstract, 
insofar as all labor processes are but representatives of the general mediatory process by which 
human subjects fashion articles that are useful using the instruments bequeathed by nature (or 
other labor processes).20 Marx considers his “point[ing] out… of this twofold nature of the labor 
                                                        
17 Capital, Vol. 1, 169. 
18 Capital, Vol. 1, 129. Emphasis added. 
19 Capital, Vol. 1, 131. 
20 This distinction alone should discredit the premise, recently promoted by theorists such as Michael Hardt and 
Toni Negri, that Marx is overly “materialistic” in his conception of “labor”; that is, that his labor theory of value 
underappreciates the “cognitive” or “intellectual” qualities of human labor that go into the formation of “value.” 
Contained already within the concept of “abstract labor” are the cognitive/intellectual properties of the different 
forms of concrete labor. To suggest that the increasing “cognitive” composition of labor in certain sectors of the 





contained in commodities” to be his chief advancement on the theories of his predecessors, for 
from this revelation, he can deduce that value is a regulating property that is not generalizable to 
all economic formations. Only in a society in which the vast majority of the products of labor 
assume the form of commodities – that is, a society in which use-values are primarily produced 
for exchange in anonymous markets – does (i) the reduction of all forms of concrete labor to 
abstract labor and (ii) the objectification of abstract labor into these products of labor as the basis 
of their interchangeability hold as the organizing principle of economic life.  
 
In other words, the standpoint that Marx is taking in developing the concept of value is 
not of labor in general, but labor within the context of a particular set of relations of production: 
“Only the products of mutually independent acts of labor, performed in isolation, can confront 
each other as commodities.”21 While “labor… is a condition of human existence which is 
independent of all forms of society,” “in a society whose products generally assume the form of 
commodities, i.e. in a society of commodity producers, this qualitative difference between the 
useful forms of labor which are carried on independently and privately by individual producers 
develops into a complex system, a social division of labor.”22 From the observation that “the 
wealth of all societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an 
‘immense collection of commodities,’” Marx has reached the conclusion that the prevalence of 
the commodity-form is indicative of an atomized system of production, one composed of actors 
that engage in the creation of use-values independently of one another and do so first and 
foremost for the stated purpose of exchanging these products with one another. Such a system 
                                                        
principle of “labor-value” to one of “knowledge-value” (to use Hardt and Negri’s terms) is a misunderstanding of 
the broad scope of Marx’s theory of value. 
21 Capital, Vol. 1, 132. 





thereby gives rise to “value” as an immaterial, and yet socially objective property that dictates 
and enforces the parameters by which these exchanges take place. The commodity-form is, as 
such, the form of appearance of use-values that circulate within a regime in which the law of 
value holds. To put the point slightly differently, value is not a metaphysical or universally-valid 
trait of all of the useful products of human labor across history. Rather, value is a relational 
abstraction, a quantifier of wealth “in the abstract” that is dependent and reflective of a set of 
social relations of production and exchange. This abstraction then, in turn, guides the self-
reproduction of the economic structure of a society that is constituted by these social relations. 
 
Not included hitherto is the crucial qualifier that Marx includes in the concept of value as 
representative of abstract labor time, namely, that the basic substratum of abstract labor time is 
determined by “the labor time required to produce to produce any use-value under the conditions 
of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of 
labor prevalent in that society.”23 For the “total labor-power of [a] society [of independent 
commodity producers]” to be, as explained above, related to each other as homogenous units of 
“identical human labor-power,” value must measure socially necessary labor time as opposed to 
labor time as such.24 This qualification is already included in the concept of “abstract labor.” 
However, the fact that the labor time regulating the ratios of exchange of commodities is based 
not solely on the conditions of an individual producer’s laboring, but the comparison between the 
conditions of his laboring and that of others like him put together (“the social average”), suggests 
that the magnitude and fluctuations of these ratios of exchange are not under the sole control of 
any single producer (or group of producers). The decentralized nature of a commodity-producing 
                                                        






society allows for alterations in the amount of labor time necessary to produce any given useful 
article, which may arise for a variety of reasons (Marx provides the examples of 
increases/decreases in labor productivity or unforeseen natural disasters),25 to potentially 
dramatically reconfigure the value-content of the products of any given number of producers. 
They occur as part of social processes “that [go] on behind the backs of the producers” 
themselves.26 The law of value, though sustained by the established relations between the 
producers, thus acts independently of their will. This already intimates the fetish character of the 
commodity that we shall touch upon later. 
 
 For now, we shall, along with Marx, delve into the relationship between value and 
exchange-value with the newfound knowledge we have acquired. Satisfied with having unveiled 
the ensemble of social relations that underpin the commodity-form, he then returns to the “world 
of appearances” to observe how value expresses itself in the act of exchange – and why, as we 
described earlier, this expression must take the form of “exchange-value”: 
 
 In fact we started from exchange-value, or the exchange relation of commodities, in order to track down the 
 value that lay hidden within it. We must now return to this form of appearance of value.27 
 
 
The Relative and Equivalent Forms: The Activation of the “Law of Value” 
 
 
 Based on the theory of value just elucidated, individual bearers of commodities enter the 
marketplace in order to swap their own use-values with a different set of use-values that carry the 
same value-content. Yet, precisely because value, socially necessary labor time, is determined 
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socially (“[commodities’] objective character as value is purely social”),28 the act of exchange is 
the only way in which the value-content of different commodities can be articulated to their 
respective owners. The placing of commodities into a relationship of exchange “announces,” so 
to speak, the various ratios at which commodities are interchangeable. The extension and 
proliferation of networks of exchange – into what we may refer to as anonymous markets – then 
solidify these ratios as the points of reference under which the independent producers carry out 
their acts of production (though they appear as arbitrary, or, worse, as intrinsic to the use-values 
themselves in the eyes of the producers; herein lies the basis for the “ideological” component of 
the commodity-form).  
 
The process of exchange is, as such, the setting of the law of value into motion. The form 
in which these exchanges take place is therefore the enunciation of the law of value par 
excellence; the appearance is inseparable from value itself, for value represents itself only 
through the forms expressed in exchange. Consequently, for Marx, the investigation into how 
repeated acts of exchange gradually crystallize the value-relations of commodities goes farther 
than explaining the significance of exchange-value. The “development of the expression of 
value… from its simplest, almost imperceptible outline” ultimately leads to the “origin of the 
money-form,” which, in turn, permits the “mystery of money” to “immediately disappear.”29 
This particular mystery we shall take up in Part II of this work; the task at hand now is to 
comprehend how the forms that commodities take up in the process of exchange “activate” the 
law of value. 
  
                                                        
28 Capital, Vol. 1, 138. 





 To reiterate, for commodities to articulate their value-content, they must be placed in 
relation to one another. This placement compels one commodity to express its value-form in the 
“natural form” (here, their objectivity as a use-value) of the other. Marx’s paradigmatic example 
of a coat and yards of linen is useful here. Once the coat and the yards of linen are brought up 
against one another, either the value of the yards of linen is expressed in “coat-form,” or the 
value of the coat is expressed in “linen-form.” That is, in exchange, one commodity “plays an 
active role… [whose] value is represented as relative value”; the other, “a passive one… 
[fulfilling] the function of equivalent.”30 The linen producer discovers the value-content of his 
product by enumerating the quantity of coats that the linen can exchange for, which represents 
the quantitative relationship of socially necessary labor time that went into the production of both 
commodities; conversely, the coat producer is made aware of the value-content of his wares by 
ascertaining the amount of linen he can obtain in their transaction. These two “poles of the 
expression of value” – the relative form and the equivalent form – are for Marx “inseparable 
moments, which belong to and mutually condition one another; but, at the same time, they are 
mutually exclusive,” insofar as a commodity cannot represent its value-content to itself, but must 
do so by “presupposing that some other commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.”31 The 
latter sheds its natural form as a use-value to assume its opposite, its value form, i.e. to become 
the “material embodiment of value,” in whose “body” the former can express, in its material 
form (here, relative form), the amount of socially necessary labor time that went into its creation. 
In a notable footnote, Marx compares these “two poles” of commodities to the inherently 
interpersonal nature of human subjectivity: 
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In a certain sense, a man is in the same situation as a commodity. As he neither enters into the world in 
 possession of a mirror, nor as a Fichtean philosopher who can say ‘I am I’, a man first sees and recognizes 
 himself in another man. Peter only relates to himself as a man through his relation to another man, Paul, in 
 whom he recognizes his likeness. With this, however, Paul also becomes from head to toe, in his physical 
 form as Paul, the form of appearance of the species man for Peter.32 
 
 What is clear, then, is that value necessitates a physical form of representation in order to 
operate as a regulatory principle in this imagined society of independent producers – and one 
commodity, forced into the role of the “equivalent” (the bearer of the form of value in general, 
or, to extend the aforementioned analogy, the form of appearance of the “species Commodity”) 
in the presence of another, always serves as this representation in any given act of exchange. 
Value “can only be expressed as an ‘objectivity,’ a thing which is materially different from the 
linen [or any other commodity] itself and yet common to the linen and all other commodities.”33 
To drive the point home, this “phantom-like objectivity” that is common to all commodities 
(their embodiment of socially necessary labor time) is what underlies the universalistic property 
of exchange-value. The search, for practical purposes, for a “universal equivalent,” or a 
commodity on whose form all other commodities can express their value-content in relative 
form, gives rise to the money-commodity. Nevertheless, the answer to the dilemma that began 
the inquiry (use- versus exchange-value), arrives, as Marx has shown, from a clearer 
understanding of the relative and equivalent forms that the commodity assumes in exchange – an 
understanding that was achieved only by his initial “descent” from the realm of appearances into 
the source of value. 
 
                                                        
32 Capital, Vol. 1, 144. Echoes of Hegel are evident in this excerpt. Note that Marx’s usage of the term “form of 
appearance” is not intended here to imply that the form is illusory or mystifying. 





 At this point, we are prepared to launch into a description of social illusions that the 
commodity as an “elementary form” engenders over the course of its trajectory from the hands of 
one independent producer to another. Before we delve into Marx’s commentary on the 
commodity fetish, however, a brief digression into the method that has excavated these 




 As can be inferred from Figure 1, as well as from our presentation, Marx’s analysis of the 
commodity-form proceeds, by and large, in the drawing out of and eventual “resolution” of 
dualistic properties in economic categories, properties that, for Marx, stand in apparent 
contradiction. The commodity is both a particular use-value with specific qualities and an item of 
universal exchangeability that is able to be indiscriminately priced. Labor carried out by 
independent producers has both a concrete and abstract component. In exchange, the 
commodities form “two poles” in the expression of value that, as quoted already, “inseparable 
moments, which belong to and mutually condition one another.” In a way, not a single one of 
these dualisms is “resolved” insofar as they fall away from the picture or cease to have an impact 
on the functioning of the system that Marx is trying to penetrate. The seeming resolution of each 
duality is instead more akin to a “displacement” of the encountered contradiction, inasmuch as 
                                                        





the explanation of each dualism immediately gives rise to a different and more complex 
contradiction (or contradictory unity), which in turn carries over the original tensions onto a 
higher, fuller plane of analysis. That is, the search for the resolutions to these dualisms brings 
into view ever more aspects of the social formation in question. The structure of the “societies in 
which the capitalist mode of production prevails” thus gradually unfolds from this peeling away 
of contradictory appearances that are revealed to be reflections of the “laws of motion” brought 
forth by a historically specific set of social relations; the revelations, for their part, demonstrate 
the necessity and persistence of these “mysterious” appearances. 
 
 Two further remarks should be added to round out this initial foray into Marx’s 
methodology. The first concerns the “fluidity” that is characteristic of the manner with which 
Marx treats the categories that he brings into play. Marx’s analysis consistently refuses to take 
any specific object of inquiry in isolation; au contraire, Marx’s insistence is precisely that only 
when placed into conversation (or into a relational “motion”) do these objects gain their socially 
objective significance. Use-value, exchange-value and value proper are not examined entirely 
separately, for they, like the relative and equivalent forms, cannot properly be understood in 
isolation from one another. Similarly, the concept of socially necessary labor time is not 
conceived of as standing “outside” of or in a simple “causal” relationship with the acts of 
exchange that they are meant to mediate (by measuring the value of commodities), since, as 
Marx claims, the acts of exchange themselves bring about the calculation and reduction of all 
different forms of labor into human labor in the abstract. The second remark, which is related to 
the first, is that, from what we have garnered so far, Marx’s approach is neither a purely 





deduction from initial foundational premises, but rather, in some sense, both things at the same 
time. His aforementioned “ascents” and “descents” to and from the realm of appearances is 
indicative of this. We have seen how Marx takes certain empirical observations – the commodity 
as the unit of wealth in capitalist societies, in this case – and then investigates, in abstract 
fashion, their dualistic properties in such a way that that these observations take on a new, richer 
meaning when he goes back to examining actually existing human activity. The lines between 
logical necessity and historical factuality are thus blurred. 
 
 These initial, somewhat murky claims will become clearer once we pick the trail of 
Capital’s analysis back up in the following sections. Nonetheless, we can intimate some of these 
comments on method by taking a closer look at Marx’s scathing (and often humorous) attacks on 
the works of the “vulgar economists.” Take, for instance, the following critique embedded in his 
discussion of the relative and equivalent forms of value: 
   
 The few economists, such as S. Bailey, who have concerned themselves with the analysis of the form of 
 value have been unable to arrive at any result, firstly because they confuse the form of value with value 
 itself, and secondly because, under the coarse influence of the practical bourgeois, they give their attention 
 from the outset, and exclusively, to the quantitative aspect of the question.35 
 
 Marx’s reservations of Bailey and company tack closely to our commentary on what 
makes his own approach unique. According to the footnote, the “economists,” first and foremost, 
by and large ignore a proper analysis of the social form of appearance. Even when they do not, 
they take the form to be equivalent to the material essence, as opposed to paying closer attention 
to the interplay between the two. Finally, they mistakenly isolate a specific “aspect of the 
                                                        





question” (here, the “quantitative” one, i.e., exchange-value) rather than embracing the dualistic 
aspects inherent in these “questions” and inquiring as to how they interact with one another or 
encounter some sort of resolution. 
 
 Unfortunately, while Samuel Bailey’s errors might have been partially motivated by 
political/class interests (“the coarse influence of the practical bourgeois”), in no sense are his 
mistakes only attributable to them. Appearances, as Marx has shown, are deceptive, and 
necessarily so, given the two-fold nature of the commodity (and of the labor going into their 
production). This is at the heart of the so-called “fetish” of the commodity, to which we shall 
now turn. 
 
The Dual Illusion of the Commodity 
 
We have observed how Marx’s dissection of the commodity has exposed properties 
intrinsic to the commodity-form that are both in apparent contradiction to one another and 
socially objective; objective, insofar as these properties are maintained (made real, made 
operable) by the collective activity of economic agents arranged under a specific set of 
productive relations. In fashioning use-values for the express purpose of market exchange, every 
independent producer inadvertently participates in a broader social process that transforms his or 
her concrete, particular labor into a quantifiable amount of abstract labor. This amount is 
determined in the balancing of the individual’s labor with the sum total of a society’s labor 
processes. Yet this comparison is achieved only in the actual act of exchange, in which the 
products of private producers “acquire a socially uniform objectivity as values.”36 In the placing 
                                                        





of commodities in relation to one another, their values both coalesce into an effective existence 
and disclose themselves to their owners. The commodities, through a momentary transmutation 
into relative and equivalent forms, express a value-relation that has “absolutely no [direct] 
connection with the physical nature of the commodity and material [dinglich] relations arising 
out of this.”37 (The translator uses the word “material” to stand for dinglich. A more literal, and 
more helpful, translation would be “thing-like.”) There in the marketplace, and only there, does 
the producer discover whether his or her act of laboring was socially necessary (use-value; 
fulfills a social necessity), and to what extent the labor time that went into the assembling of his 
or her product measures up to the socially-determined “average” labor time (exchange-value). 
The producer, in short, is informed of his relation to other producers indirectly, through the 
relation of his commodity to the commodities of others. The social relations between persons and 
the material relations between things are, therefore, in the eyes of the commodity producers 
transposed into material (“thing-like”) relations between persons and social relations between 
things. The commodity passes from being “an extremely obvious, trivial thing” to “a thing which 
transcends consciousness,” a thing that, seemingly by its own “socio-natural” endowments, 
mystically regulates the activity of its producer.38  
 
The illusion that arises from commodities is, as we have already intimated, a result of the 
social form and characteristics of the labor of their producers. Because “the private producer’s 
brain reflects [the social character] of his [or her] labor only in the forms which appear… in the 
exchange of products,” he or she perceives the value of his or her product as resultant not from 
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the socially necessary labor time expended, but from the commodity itself.39 The producers do 
not labor and bring their commodities to the realm of exchange because they identify them “as 
the material integuments of homogeneous human labor.”40 Rather, they, without being aware of 
it, equate their labors in the act of equating their products. In so doing, they establish the value-
relations that come to then determine, in place of their own motivations, the content of their 
productive activity. Their production processes separated from one another, the independent 
producers depend instead on the market’s past list of exchange-values to decide what kind of 
laboring to undertake and which instruments to use. The ever-changing character of the “real 
abstraction” of socially necessary labor time, calculated on the basis of the varying productive 
capacities of the producers (skill, technological expedients, etc.), further intensifies the 
impression that the commodities themselves are the “natural” conveyors of all value, to which 
human beings must subject themselves: “The magnitudes [of value] vary continually, 
independently of the will, foreknowledge and actions of the exchangers.”41 The upshot is that the 
producers conceive of “their own movement within society” in “the form of a movement made 
by things, and these things, far from being under their control, in fact control them.”42 
Generalized commodity production substitutes direct relations between producers with indirect 
ones, mediated by things (“social hieroglyphics”). As such, the fetishistic attribution of value to 
commodities is “inseparable from the production of commodities.”43 Even Marx’s own account 
of the law of value will not “[banish] the semblance of objectivity possessed by the social 
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characteristics of labor,”44 for their social objectivity exists above and beyond the explanations 
of the analyst. The mystification of the commodity persists as long as the conditions for its 
production persist. 
 
The commodity-form, in this respect, is akin to the spells of Goethe’s sorcerer’s 
apprentice. Sensuous things “which [are] at the same time supra-sensible or social,” their very   
existence is, as Marx has demonstrated, evidence of an economic structure that operates 
precisely by “[concealing] the social character of private labor and the social relations between 
the individual workers [producers], by making those relations appear as relations between 
material objects, instead of revealing them plainly.”45 The extension of markets, the 
commodification of an ever greater number of products, and, eventually, the appearance of a 
universally-accepted money-commodity all bury deeper the socio-historical origins of the 
commodity-form. At this point in his discussion of the fetish, Marx touches upon the failure of 
the political economists of his time to grasp precisely this point; especially relevant to our 
interest, he also offers a few comments on the nature of social scientific procedure in general. 
The “scientific”46 economists, for Marx, managed to apprehend a suitable (albeit truncated) 
theory of value: “The belated scientific discovery that the products of labor… are merely the 
material expressions of the human labor expended to produce them, [sic] marks an epoch in the 
history of mankind’s development.”47 The praise for Smith, Ricardo, et al. is tempered, however, 
by their critical inability to break through the historical specificity of the commodity. Since 
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reflection on the commodity-form, like of “all forms of human life,” took place only after 
commodities had already assumed their prominent role in economic life (“post festum”), the 
theories of value posited by the economists inappropriately regard all products of human labor, 
regardless of the social environment of their producers, to derive their value from that labor.48 In 
doing so, they take the commodity to be a supra-historical form, the social law of value to be a 
“natural” law, and value itself to be a universally applicable category. This is, then, no more than 
a more refined version of the fetish: “The categories of bourgeois economics… are forms of 
thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of production 
belonging to this historically determined mode of production.”49 Marx, by contrast, wishes to 
indicate how “the whole mystery of commodities… vanishes… as soon as we come to other 
forms of production.”50 In this detour, we will also come across a second component of the 
illusion that the commodity-form promotes. 
 
Classical political economy, thus, floundered in its analysis of the commodity-form 
precisely because it did not come to recognize it as a form of appearance, a form that is 
underwritten by a specific and historical social formation. Their texts “never once asked the 
question why this content [commodities] has assumed that particular form,” and hence 
interpreted exchange-value as a material, rather than social, property.51 As a corrective, Marx 
turns his attention to social formations the use-values of which do not assume the form of 
commodities, choosing, in particular, three examples that can be classified under two separate 
headings.  
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One the one hand, he singles out the feudal-manorial mode of production of medieval 
Europe, in which “instead of the independent man, we find everyone dependent.”52 In this world 
“shrouded by darkness” (an ironic rebuttal to the bourgeois perception of commodity society as 
being “bathed in light”), each producer is tied by their respective social position into relations of 
dependence to their superiors and to one another. Their productive activity, as such, is organized 
and dictated by their places within the various hierarchies, whether serf, lord, vassal, suzerain, 
layman, or cleric. Their productive relations, to use a comparison alluded to above, are direct 
rather than indirect. They relate to one another economically as persons with subjective wills, not 
through the intermediary of commodities, anonymous markets, etc. Their labor, used to shape 
products that are distinguished and disbursed in kind directly to other members in the social 
order, assumes an immediate social form rather than a universal one as in a commodity-
producing society. Since the “relations of personal dependence form the given social foundation, 
there is no need for labor and its products to assume a [fetishistic] form different from their 
reality.”53 The peasant is plainly aware of the figures (landlord, other peasants) for whom he 
expends labor or to whom he delivers a product of his or her labor; to church-goers, “the tithe 
owed to the priest is more clearly apparent than his blessing.”54 Irrespective of how we may 
appraise the social roles in feudal society, the reality is that the relations between the holders of 
these roles are not “disguised as social relations between things, between the products of 
labor.”55 
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Similarly, a singular peasant household, or, more broadly, “an association of free men, 
working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different 
forms of labor-power is full self-awareness as one single social labor force,” represent for Marx 
communal modes of production that distribute their members’ labor and the products of their 
labor in a direct, transparent fashion.56 However, the regulative processes of material production 
and distribution in these bodies are decided upon in a conscious, deliberative decision-making 
procedure, relying not on the systems of dominance and servitude of ancient or feudal society, 
nor on the anarchic and mystifying real abstractions of bourgeois (i.e., commodity-producing) 
society, but rather (in particular as regards the second of these two examples) the open and free 
participation of their members. There are, like in the feudal world, no incongruent forms of 
appearance to be found here, at least with respect to the sphere of material self-reproduction.  
 
Taken together, these schemas can be represented by the following diagrams:   
 
 
                                                        







 where M stands for a member of the society in question, P a product of labor, parallel 
lines the relations of dependence “in virtue of which products change hands,” and arrows the 
flow of the products amongst the members.58 With these comparisons, we can begin to 
countenance why, in part, the issue of fetish, objective illusion, ideology, etc. in the economic 
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sphere is unique to the capitalist mode of production, and of vital importance to the social 
scientist attempting to penetrate the system’s inner functioning. Market society breeds by its own 
structure forms of appearance that obscure itself, its own historicity, and the relations that bind 
together the members trapped in its web. The commodity-form is merely the first of these. 
 
 Yet both Figure 2 and Marx himself highlight another feature of commodity-producing 
society that we have hitherto not dealt with. For commodity production to be a society’s 
dominant form of laboring, there must have developed a degree of labor specialization (a 
division of labor) that far surpasses any found in either feudal society or in the peasant 
household. Instead of producing the necessities of life for himself or herself and his or her 
superior (as in feudal society) or for an individual household’s consumption (as in the peasant 
homestead), the members of market society shape products (in most cases, just one) specifically 
to the market and from their intercourse with other producers derive all other items they require 
to sustain themselves. The material foundation upon which a commodity-producing society can 
arise, thus, is the greater, not lesser, dependency of producers to one another than in all other 
previous historical “material conditions of existence.”59 However, by virtue of the strict 
separation of the producers from one another, that is, by virtue of their indirect relations of 
production, the inhabitants of market society believe themselves to exist in relative independence 
as compared to the serf.60 While the latter is plainly in a state of bondage to another individual 
(or group of individuals), the former’s dependence is not personified at all; rather, their 
dependence is to the abstraction of the market as a whole, over which no single producer has 
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absolute control. There is, in other words, an illusory perception of individual freedom (that is, a 
supposed lack of constraints on individual activity by the activity of others) inherent in the fetish 
of the commodity. In place of the immediate (legal or otherwise) relations of bondage or 
subjection in feudal society, there is the ever greater dependence that accompanies such an 
extensive socialization of labor, which is, nonetheless held in private, “independent” hands:  
 
The same division of labor which turns them [the owners of commodities] into independent private 
 producers also makes the social process of production and the relations of the individual producers to each 
 other within that process independent of the producers themselves… The independence of the individuals 
 from each other has as its counterpart and supplement a system of all-around material dependence.61 
 
 The criticism Marx is levying in this excerpt is not at the situation of material dependence 
per se, but rather at the misleading character of such a dependence. More important, however, is 
the fact that the economic processes of market society are independent of the producers 
themselves. The exchange-value regime of commodity production fosters in its participants an 
ignorance of the social reality that they themselves reproduce through their actions. Indeed, “the 
religious reflections of the real world” – what we have referred to here as the objective illusion, 
or fetish, of the commodity – “can, in any case, vanish only when the practical relations of 
everyday life between man and man, man and nature, generally present themselves to him in a 
transparent and rational form.”62 That is, the ideological “veil” that blankets the minds of the 
independent producers “is not removed from… the process of material production until it 
becomes production by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious and planned 
control.”63 To reiterate a claim stated earlier, knowledge of the ideological nature of the 
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commodity-form is not sufficient to do away with its deleterious effects (or its functioning as an 
objective form of appearance). Only a radical break with the relations of production that are 
contained in the form itself can accomplish this task. 
 
 Before we continue on our path through Marx’s narrative, let us pause to assess the 
normative claim that he is establishing in his diagnosis of the commodity fetish.64 As the quotes 
from the previous paragraph indicate, there is a deep sense in which Marx regards the objective 
illusions of commodity-producing society, setting aside, for the moment, all the other 
pathologies in it that he diagnoses, to be undesirable in and of themselves. The presence of a 
disconnect between the social realities of men and the way they understand their position is 
directly antithetical to the broader aspiration for “conscious and planned control” over mankind’s 
material conditions of life. Not only does ideology ahistoricize and thereby naturalize what are 
transient modes of social existence, but the distortions in behavior that these forms of appearance 
induce ensnare the productive forces of society within a social structure that misrepresents them. 
Production for value proper, rather than use-value, is rational only in “a social formation in 
which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite.”65 The creation 
of a post-capitalist communalistic society (a communist society?) is, then, the creation of a 
society that properly aligns the social form of production with the actual content of production 
with which human beings relate to one another, to themselves, and to nature. Marx has a long 
way to go still in proving that the “mastery” of commodity-producing society does, in fact, run 
counter to the self-realization of human creative and developmental potential. Nonetheless, the 
                                                        
64 The following comments are partly inspired by G. A. Cohen’s own discussion on fetishism. Cf. “Communism as 
the Liberation of the Content,” in Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, 129-133.  





fetish of the commodity already gives him, and us, an inkling that there is a greater freedom and 
material mode of existence than what bourgeois society has to offer. 
 
  
Part II: The Money-Form and the Circulation of Commodities 
 
 
The Crystallization of Money through Exchange 
 
 Up to this point, we have only peripherally dealt with the emergence of a money-
commodity in the analysis of the commodity-form. That analysis, nonetheless, has brought forth 
an increasingly complex social landscape in its wake. We behold, at this stage, a social formation 
that is composed of independent, private producers, who, as bearers of commodities, relate to 
one another as owners of a particular form of private property. In the marketplace, they truck, 
barter and exchange their particular use-values (which are not useful to them) for other use-
values of the same value (which are). Given the “spontaneously developed” division of labor in 
this commodity-producing society, their own use-values, in the form of commodities, “must be 
realized” through exchange “as values before they can be realized as use-values [before, in other 
words, they can be consumed].”66They hence confront one another in a contractual relationship 
that is, in effect, a “relation between two wills which mirrors the economic relationship.”67 For 
each commodity-owner, every other commodity in the market is a potential equivalent for his or 
her own, and his or hers is, conversely, a universal equivalent to all others. Since, however, this 
process of exchange “cannot be simultaneously for all owners of commodities both exclusively 
individual and exclusively social and general,” there crystallizes out of the repeated transactions 
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between equivalents a particular commodity that is set apart as the universal equivalent; i.e., a 
commodity that externalizes the duality of use-value and exchange-value in the commodity by 
embodying exchange-value; a commodity, in short, whose use-value is its exchange-value.68 The 
money-commodity, thus, reflects the “broadening and deepening of the phenomenon of 
exchange” to the point where the “opposition” between use-value and exchange-value expresses 
itself in its own form of appearance.69  
 
For Marx, the introduction of a money-commodity is a momentous shift, for the gradual 
acceptance of a universal equivalent “does not abolish [the] contradictions [of the commodity-
form], but rather provides the form in which they have room to move.”70 The emergence of 
money confirms commodity production and distribution as a “normal” social process (a socially 
regulating metabolism). He adds, in a crucial statement, that “this is, in general, the way in which 
contradictions are resolved.”71 As we have described in our first incursion into Capital’s 
methodological apparatus, to which we shall return later, this identification of contradictions in 
social forms and their “resolution” in other, “higher” forms is the animating dynamic of Marx’s 
entire enterprise. Through the careful attention to the origins of these forms, the ways in which 
they interact with one another, and the manner by which they influence and guide the behavior of 
the economic agents that operate under them, Marx is able to piece together the inner structure of 
the mode of production that he is proffering a critique of – and reveal the illusions that such a 
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structure precipitates. From the “elementary form” of the commodity, he has so far built up the 
basic architecture of a market society.  
 
The crystallization of the money-form refines, and greatly disturbs, this simplistic picture 
of independent commodity producers. The money-commodity, by becoming through the “action 
of society” the incarnation of “human labor as such,” or of social wealth in the abstract, 
transforms the “direct exchange of products” into a generalized circuit of circulation of 
commodities and of the money-commodity, which differs from the former “not only in form, but 
in its essence.”72 With the appearance of a money-commodity, all other commodities are only 
expressible and realizable through the intermediary of such a commodity. Commodity-owners 
must, therefore, pass through “two opposite and complementary movements,” the sale of their 
commodities, and the purchase, from the proceeds of their sale, of other commodities of 
equivalent value.73 No longer constrained by the occasional manifestation of a dual coincidence 
of wants, they are now instead obliged to change into money-form the value of their 
commodities, before converting that value back again into a different set of commodities. The 
configuration of the process of exchange is altered, with, as Marx depicts, radical ramifications. 
Exchange assumes the shape of two interlinked but “antithetical metamorphoses” in the form of 
value, first from commodity-form to money-form, then from money-form back to commodity-
form.  
 
From our initial standpoint of C-C (Barter/Direct Exchange), we come through the 
money-commodity to the more intricate C-M-C, made up of the two nominally independent 
                                                        
72 Capital, Vol. 1, 207. 





processes of C-M (Sale/Purchase) and M-C (Purchase/Sale). Commodities still “first enter into 
the process of exchange… retaining their home-grown shape,” but the new circulation of 
commodities “produces a differentiation of the commodity into two elements, commodities and 
money, an external opposition which expresses the opposition between use-value and value 
which is inherent in it.”74 The independent producers are thereby themselves differentiated into 
buyers, or owners of money, and sellers, or owners of commodities. A single “movement” in any 
individual chain is simultaneously the complementary movement in another, as a seller’s 
transformation of commodities into money is simultaneously the transformation of a buyer’s 
money (which, as a quantifiable amount of value, originally came into being as commodities 
before being sold) into commodities. The passing through the chain itself requires a seller to 
assume the position of a buyer before he or she can finally transfer the original value of his 
commodities, in the form of other commodities, out of the realm of circulation and into the realm 
of consumption.  
 
 The weaving together of various chains of Commodity-Money-Commodity into a fully-
fledged web of exchange-relations promotes the passage of commodities beyond the temporal 
and spatial limitations of direct exchange: 
 
 We see here, on the one hand, how the exchange of commodities breaks through all the individual and local 
 limitations of the direct exchange of products, and develops the metabolic process of human labor. On the 
 other hand, there develops a whole network of social connections of natural origin, entirely beyond the 
 control of the human agents.75 
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 Maintaining the entire net in place is the transfer of a certain amount of the money-
commodity from buyers to sellers, which continues to circulate even as innumerable 
commodities enter and exit the marketplace. To examine more closely the impact that the 
induction of money has on the economic makeup of market society, Marx goes on to evaluate the 
different roles played by money in the circulation of commodities, roles that, he argues, can and 
often do come into conflict with one another. 
 
Before considering these roles in greater detail, however, Marx distinguishes a fetish of 
the money-form that replicates, and strengthens, the original fetish of the commodity-form. 
Money, as we have already established, is but a commodity like any other, and therefore has a 
value concomitant to the socially necessary labor time necessary for its production. What 
separates the money-commodity from all other commodities, as already explained, is its socially-
imposed status as the “universal equivalent”; viz., the fact that, through the tacit agreement of 
commodity-owners, the values of all commodities are expressed through a quantity of money. 
The money-form, to wit, “is merely the reflection thrown upon a single commodity by the 
relations between all other commodities.”76 Yet the necessity, in pecuniary circulation, for every 
independent producer to transform the value-content of their commodities into the shape of a 
sum of money, to carry out, that is, their transactions solely through the value-form of the 
money-commodity, leads them to mistakenly attribute the money-commodity’s capacity to 
universally express value as an inherent, natural property of money, rather than a property that 
emerges from the social relations that first led to the adoption of one commodity as the money-
commodity. This “false semblance,” as Marx remarks, is not a mental fiction that has no 
                                                        





correspondence with reality, for what indeed “appears to happen” is that “not that a particular 
commodity becomes money because all other commodities express their values in it, but, on the 
contrary, that all other commodities express their values in a particular commodity because it is 
money.”77 “Without any initiative on their part,” commodities confront in the marketplace, 
“ready at hand,” a unique commodity that apparently of its own accord tabulates their abstract-
labor content.78 Silver, gold, banknotes, etc. seem to rise out from their mines, or come off the 
printing presses, already as the “direct incarnation of all human labor.”79 We have before us, 
then, another illusion that is both immanent and objective to the economic structure of market 
society. In the end, because the money-form is nothing else than the natural progression and 
proliferation of the commodity-form, “the riddle of the money fetish is… the riddle of the 
commodity fetish.”80 
 
The political economists, once again, were long baffled by this form of appearance, as 
they proceeded “from [money’s] finished shape in order to analyze it afterward.”81 Unable to 
reconstruct or coherently account for the social relations that confer on money its position as the 
universal equivalent (not its value, but its value-form), they regarded money as either a simple 
symbol, or as the bearer of an “imaginary” value (born from “human reflection”), before finally 
apprehending money as a commodity proper, although “nothing more.”82 Marx again reiterates 
the importance of a social scientific method that apprehends the historicity of social forms, like 
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his: “The difficulty lies not in comprehending that money is a commodity, but in discovering 
how, why and by what means a commodity becomes money.”83 Likewise, the Utopian socialists 
(Saint-Simon, Owen, Fourier, et al.) and Proudhon sought to rid their ideal societies of the 
money-form by substituting money with labor-tokens, or other similar items, unaware that they 
would inadvertently function as the very money they had hoped to stamp out. They did so, Marx 
insists, because they did not discern that money exists in commercial society not by decree, or 
(only) because a particular commodity has a particular set of physical properties, but because 
production in such a society assumes the form of commodity production. They would not be the 
last to do so, as countless half-baked “Grand Solutions to the Economic Problem” continue to be 
churned out to this day that commit the same fundamental mistake. The fetish of the money-form 
extends its way from the bustle of the marketplace to the hushed halls of the Ivory Tower, it 
would seem, with relative ease. 
 
Money as Measure of Value, Medium of Circulation and Privately-Held Social Power 
 
 
 We now proceed to scrutinize the various roles of money. 
 
The first and perhaps most straightforward role that money fulfills in the circulation of 
commodities is as a measure of value. By denominating the value-content of each and every 
other commodity in terms of itself, the money-commodity externalizes the exchange-value 
component of commodities into the “purely ideal or notional form” of price. Price is “ideal,” for 
Marx, insofar as the denomination of commodities in units of gold, silver, etc. is a referent that 
reduces the infinite sequences of relative and equivalent forms between commodities to a single 
sequence of ratios between commodities and the money-commodity. Hence, with money, “the 






endless series itself is now a socially given fact in the shape of the prices of the commodities.”84 
The socially necessary labor time imbued in any single commodity is expressed in the units of 
money that require, for their production, the same amount of labor time. Fluctuations in the 
labor-content of the money-commodity result in general rises or falls (depending on the direction 
of the fluctuation) in the prices of commodities, though the relative prices of commodities 
themselves stay the same. Conversely, the price-form records adjustments (through isolated 
improvements or deteriorations in labor productivity, etc.) in the social labor time necessary for 
the production of different commodities (relative prices), though the value of the money-
commodity remains the same. Nothing in this explanation so far goes against or complicates 
Marx’s earlier exposition of the law of value: “The expression of the equivalence of a 
commodity with the quantity of money whose name is that commodity’s price is,” after all, “a 
tautology.”85 The price-form, in this regard, is a mental instrument that simply facilitates the 
process of exchange. 
 
 The magnitude of value of a commodity, which, through the price-form, appears as the 
ratio of exchange between the commodity and money, is therefore disclosed to commodity-
owners without the need for a comparison of their own commodities with all others in turn. 
Marx, nevertheless, does attend to two important stipulations that attend the price-form.  
 
Firstly, the price-form “may express both the magnitude of value… and the greater or 
lesser quantity of money for which it can be sold under the given circumstances.”86 The 
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externalization of exchange-value in the commodity designated as money, in other words, allows 
for a quantitative discrepancy between value-content and price-form, a discrepancy that reflects 
the conditions under which a given commodity is brought to the market. This possibility, 
“inherent in the price-form,” is, for Marx, not a flaw of a monetized economy, but is instead 
“adequate… for a mode of production whose laws can only assert themselves as blindly 
operating averages between constant irregularities.”87 Equilibrium, contra the economists’ 
expectations, is largely an ephemeral and accidental feature of a society in which the conditions 
of production and exchange are not dependent on or directed by the wills of the producers 
themselves. However, the presentation of a fleshed-out analysis of the possible divergences 
between price and value is, for the time being, postponed.88 
  
 Secondly, and complementary to the aforementioned “quantitative incongruity,” the 
price-form can “harbor a qualitative contradiction,” insofar as prices can be attached to objects 
that are not, in fact, commodities (and, therefore, have no value).89 The extension of monetary 
valuation into spheres of activity that are not economic, strictly speaking, will play a greater role 
once we go on, with Marx, to consider the contradictions in the various uses of the money-
commodity. What is already made clear, however, is that money, as a measure of value, can 
bestow on “things such as conscience, honor, etc… the form of commodities through their 
price,” a form, we should note, that is in some sense also illusory, for these things are not 
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commodities in the way a product of labor is.90 The implications of such a multifaceted ability 
are enormous, as we shall see shortly. 
 
 Both of these digressions point to a broader dictum. The adoption of money as a measure 
of value renders conventional barter impossible, at least on an economy-wide scale. When 
exchange-value assumes the shape of a commodity called or referred to as money, the ability for 
other commodities to realize their respective exchange-values for their owners is inexorably tied 
to their ability to be exchanged for money. While the commodity-owner may establish his or her 
commodity’s price “in the imagination,” the commodity “must be actually replaced by [the 
money-commodity]… to render… the service of a universal equivalent.”91 Were he or she to 
bring his or her commodity to a different commodity-owner, the latter would not be satisfied 
solely with the first commodity’s price as sufficient evidence for the admissibility of trade. The 
price-form at the same time acknowledges the universal exchangeability of commodities with 
money, as well as the requirement of such exchanges. To use Marx’s trenchant phrase: “Hard 
cash lurks within the ideal measure of value [price].”92 
 
 This, then, points us to the second fundamental role of money, namely, money as medium 
of circulation. For the independent producers to effectuate the value of their commodities, they 
must ensure that their commodities undergo the “salto mortale” of sale. Only when their useful 
labor “pupates into the homogenous social materialization of undifferentiated human labor,” i.e., 
into a specific amount of money, can they convert their useful labor into a group of commodities 
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that is actually useful for them. This was already illustrated in the previous section, in which we 
described the circuit of exchange with the existence of money as the constant passing of buyers 
and sellers through “two opposite and complementary movements” (C-M, M-C) in order to 
effectuate the double “metamorphoses” of their value in the form of commodities into another set 
of commodities through the intermediary of money. Money, from this perspective, is the 
necessary “grease” that sustains the entire network of exchange. The amount of the money-
commodity in circulation, the number of times that each quantum of the money-commodity turns 
over (the velocity of money), and the persistent displacement of the money-commodity from one 
hand to the next become essential determinants in the successful regulation of the circulation of 
commodities in this society of independent producers (clothed now alternatively as buyers and 
sellers). The “continuity of the movement” of commodities “depends entirely on [the movement] 
of money,” the interruption of which would result in a breakdown of the entire economic 
edifice.93 
 
 Concomitant to this indispensable function is, of course, yet another false impression that 
arises out of the nature of monetary circulation. Though commodities are engaged in two 
separate motions over the course of purchase and sale, money flows in a unidirectional fashion 
throughout the entire process, moving from a buyer to a seller and then again to a new seller 
from the former seller (now turned buyer). Money welcomes commodities in and sees them out 
of the realm of circulation, but in doing so remains in their place to repeat the process again and 
again, “in this way continually moving away from its own starting-point.”94 As Marx notes, “the 
very nature of the circulation of commodities produces the semblance of the opposite,” that is, 
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that “the replacement of one commodity by another… appears not to have been mediated by its 
own change of form [from commodity to money to commodity], but rather by the [role] of 
money as means of circulation [medium of circulation].”95 Thus, although the movement of the 
money-commodity is the necessary consequence of the circulation of commodities, “the situation 
appears to be the reverse of this, namely the circulation of commodities seems to be the result of 
the movement of money.”96 This obfuscation, like the others we have highlighted in the course 
of this unfolding, projects the operation of a specific set of social relations onto the supposedly 
innate, material properties of an object that is, in the end, the natural offshoot of these relations. 
The former are concealed from view as the latter are elevated to occult, fantastical status. 
 
 Regardless, the difficulties that emerge with the use of money as medium of circulation 
become more obvious once we admit that the acts of purchase and sale are not, indeed, 
symmetrical. Commodities must all endeavor to be converted into money, but money has no 
such necessary obligation in return. “Commodities are in love with money, but… ‘the course of 
true love never did run smooth’.”97 Selling is, as such, a much more onerous task than buying. 
The seller may discover when bringing his or her produce to the marketplace that his 
commodity’s value is not what he anticipated (the labor time expended being worth less from an 
abstract, social standpoint), or that a new commodity has displaced his or her own in the 
fulfilment of a social need (the labor time expended being worthless), etc. The buyer, on the 
other hand, is free to dispose of his or her money in any manner that he wishes, or even not to 
dispose of it at all. The ability of one commodity-owner to properly reap the benefits of the value 
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of his or her commodity is, in pecuniary circulation, dependent on the repeated transfer of money 
from the hands of a long chain of other commodity-owners. Stoppages in the transit of the 
circulating medium thus greatly imperil the entire social process of material self-reproduction. 
To belabor a point already raised, the introduction of money separates what was once a singular 
process (Commodity-Commodity) into two independent, antithetical processes (Commodity-
Money, and Money-Commodity). This formal separation thus creates the possibility of 
disruption that was not present under the regime of direct exchange: 
 
 To say that these mutually independent and antithetical processes form an internal unity is to say also that 
 their internal unity moves forward through external antithesis [sale and purchase]. These two processes lack 
 internal independence because they complement each other. Hence, if the assertion of their external 
 independence [äusserliche Verselbständigung] proceeds to a certain critical point, their unity violently 
 makes itself felt by producing – a crisis. There is an antithesis, immanent in the commodity, between use-
 value and value, between private labor which must simultaneously manifest itself as directly social labor, 
 and a particular concrete kind of labor which simultaneously counts as merely abstract universal labor… 
 The antithetical phases of the metamorphosis of the commodity are the developed forms of motion of this 
 immanent contradiction. [Emphasis added.]98  
 
 Notwithstanding Marx’s somewhat turgid language, the argument in this excerpt is not 
too troublesome to parse. Repeated instances of sales without subsequent purchases (C-Ms 
without M-Cs) represent instances of the “assertion of [the two processes’] external 
independence,” which, if continued up to “a certain critical point,” run up against the necessary 
“internal unity” of the two (C-M-C). We should also take note of Marx’s description of this 
crisis-inducing contradiction between the independence of sale and purchase and the necessary 
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unity between the two as the “developed form” of the original, founding contradiction between 
use-value and exchange-value we encountered in the commodity-form (which led us to the 
contradiction between private labor and social labor, concrete labor and abstract labor, and so 
on). The coalescing of the money-form was, as we explained in the beginning of this Part, the 
ostensive “resolution” of this contradiction. Yet, in keeping with Marx’s method, we now 
discover that the money-form merely permitted this contradiction to “move” in a more complex 
plane of analysis. The contradiction was not done away with; the opposition resurfaces in a new, 
“developed” form. 
 
 We have not yet explained what, precisely, would lead buyers to hoard (or save) money 
to such an intolerable degree (i.e., to perform repeated instances of C-M but not M-C). Certainly, 
temporal mismatches between the production and distribution of commodities could in theory 
accumulate to bring about the aforementioned moment of crisis. However, a more reliable 
answer to our question lies in an object of analysis that we have already passed over, even if we 
did not recognize it as such then. This is the role of money as measure of value, or, to better 
capture our meaning here, as store of value.  
 
 We saw that money, as the externalization of value itself, makes everything saleable and 
purchasable, even those things that are not, properly speaking, commodities. Money, being the 
socially-designated universal equivalent, the basic, abstract unit of societal wealth, the 
embodiment of socially necessary labor time, does away with all qualitative distinctions. Yet 





individual.”99 As more and more objects of society are changed into commodities 
(“commodified”), therefore, the power that the holder of money has over society increases: 
“With the extension of commodity circulation there is an increase in the power of money, that 
absolutely social form of wealth which is always ready to be used.”100 Social power becomes, 
through the existence of money, the personal possession of private persons. Moreover, the 
possession of money is, by its quantitative nature, theoretically limitless. To wit, “this 
contradiction between the quantitative limitation and the qualitative lack of limitation of money 
keeps driving the hoarder back to his Sisyphean task: accumulation.”101 Consequently, “with 
more developed commodity production, every producer is compelled to secure for himself the 
nexus rerum, the ‘social pledge’….With the possibility of keeping hold of the commodity as 
exchange-value, or exchange-value as a commodity, the lust for gold [the money-commodity] 
awakens.”102  
 
Even if the social power of money is not attractive enough, the potentially precarious 
conditions of the independent producer in market society compels him or her to hoard: “His [or 
her] needs are ceaselessly renewed, and necessitate the continual purchase of other people’s 
commodities, whereas the production and sale of his [or her] own commodities costs time and is 
subject to various accidents… In order then to be able to buy without selling, he [or she] must 
have sold previously without buying.”103 We should recall the volatile nature of social necessary 
labor time, which is determined by aggregate social conditions and not by an individual alone. 
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Hoarding (or, here, saving) is, as such, is not an aberrant form of behavior, but is rather 
motivated by the money-form itself. 
 
 As a universal measure and store of value, money beckons its own accumulation. As 
medium of circulation, it demands its consistent and regular displacement. There is, as is now 
plain, an acute tension between these two roles. What is to be done when “instead of being 
merely a way of mediating the metabolic process [Stoffwechsel],” the first change of form from 
commodities to money (the first “metamorphosis” of C to M) “becomes an end in itself”?104 
Marx points out that hoards are not wholly detrimental to the operation of the economic 
structure, for they can act “as channels through which money may flow in and out” of the realm 
of exchange. In so doing, they allow the total supply of the money-commodity to expand and 
contract in order to meet the fluctuating needs of circulation accordingly.105 This does not, 
however, resolve the contradiction at the heart of the money-form. Marx looks for a resolution 
instead in a third role of money: money as means of payment. 
 
Money as Means of Payment  
 
 
 The previous section highlighted the immanent opposition between money as a measure 
and store of value and money as a medium of circulation. We discussed, as well, the powerful 
incentives to hoard (or save), encouraged by both the social power bestowed by the money-
commodity on its owner and the economic security that an adequate hoard can provide to 
independent commodity producers. The tension created by the necessity for money to flow 
unimpeded and for producers to hold on to money as the “social pledge” finds, for Marx, relief in 
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the widespread formation of credit relations, in which sales occur without money immediately 
needing to change hands. The money-form creates the high probability, if not altogether the 
inevitability, that a “commodity-owner… steps forth as a seller before [an]other is ready to 
buy.”106 The latter can, however, come to possess the use-value (in the form of a commodity) of 
the former in that same moment by becoming “the representative of future money,” setting a 
later date that delays his obligation to pay.107 The dramatis personae of the process of exchange 
are therefore transubstantiated yet again: “The seller becomes a creditor, the buyer becomes a 
debtor.”108 Money, too, acquires a new purpose as these social relations are modified. Instead of 
mediating, in real time, the transfer of equivalent values from one form to the other, the money-
commodity enters into circulation independently, in a temporal sense, from the actual movement 
of commodities so as to settle chains of payment. In short, money becomes the universally-
accepted means of payment of market society. The twin metamorphoses of Commodity-Money 
and Money-Commodity are further severed as money develops into “the universal material of 
contracts.”109  
 
 Marx goes on a brief detour here to indicate that even as means of payment, money still 
carries within itself the seeds of crisis; that is, that money as a mediator of creditor-debtor 
relations does not completely subdue the potentialities of disturbance, but rather displaces them 
to a new form, namely, that of fatal interruptions in the chains of payment. When balancing 
accounts of payment, money “functions only nominally... as a measure of value.”110 Yet when 
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the obligations fall due, money “changes over” once more “into hard cash…. Profane 
commodities can no longer replace it.”111 The aforementioned “unity” of purchase and sale can 
still “violently” assert itself if the “external independence” of the two “antithetical” processes is 
carried too far. The appearance and proliferation of credit-moneys is only able to stave off this 
possibility, not abolish it altogether. We shall not concern ourselves with this contention in any 
further detail, as an analysis of credit-based monetary crises is secondary to our larger goal.112 
 
 What is relevant to us is the shift in perspective, first announced by the discussion on 
hoards, and then given greater emphasis by the form of money as means of payment, from 
money as a mediator of an exchange of equivalents (C-M-C) to money as the be-all and end-all 
of exchange. We began this Part by assuming exchange to be motivated solely for the sake of 
use-value. Now, we confront the prospect of exchange being sought out for the purpose of 
enhancing exchange-value; that is, the prospect of the start and endpoint of a circulatory cycle 
being money, not commodities (M-C-M). For the creditor, after all, “the value-form of the 
commodity, money, has now become the self-sufficient purpose of the sale.”113 Given our 
description of the process of exchange as being the exchange of equivalents (equivalent value for 
equivalent value), we are currently incapable of properly accounting for this pattern of exchange. 
No producer, under the framework hitherto adhered to, can withdraw from circulation more 
value in the form of money than what he or she introduces. How can exchange-value, then, be 
the “the self-sufficient purpose” of the circulation of commodities? Exchange-value can only be 
the primary motor of exchange if the money withdrawn from circulation at a cycle’s end is 
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quantitatively greater than what was originally interjected (M-C-[M + ΔM]). In existing market 
societies, we witness, indeed, an innumerable amount of transactions that conclude with an 
expansion of exchange-value, expansions that are tabulated under the index of profit. The 
incidence and pursuit of profit, however, directly contravene the premises of the logical edifice 
that Marx has assembled thus far. We shall follow him, in the next and final Part, as he attempts 
to solve this new incongruity. 
 
 We would do well to stop momentarily to comment on the evolution of Marx’s narrative 
before picking its thread back up in the sections to come. We expand the diagram of Figure 1 to 








 Marx’s argument, as we can see more distinctly in Figure 3, continues to progress 
through a series of what we may refer to as “dialectical leaps.” From the examination of a given 
social form, there arises an analytical insufficiency, expressed as a contradiction inherent in the 
form, that is in need of a settlement in a new conceptual form. The contradiction, in other words, 
is evidence for Marx (and for us) of the incompleteness of the picture of society as the picture 
stands at that point in the analysis. This was the case when we delved into the intricacies of the 
commodity-form, and this has also been the case during our foray into the money-form. Money 
crystallizes out of the repeated exchanges of commodities to embody exchange-value, as a 
natural outgrowth of the dualism of the equivalent and relative forms of commodities. As the 
                                                        





embodiment of exchange-value, money segregates commodity-owners into buyers and sellers, 
substitutes the singular process of direct exchange for two “antithetical” processes, and pits these 
agents and these processes against each other as both the measure of value and the medium of 
circulation. The social relations that strive to counteract this antagonism take the form of credit 
relations, but these still contain within them the antinomy of use- and exchange-value from 
which we initiated. The picture grows considerably more complex as the contradictions are given 
room to “move.” 
 
What can now be appreciated as particularly potent in Marx’s method, and which was not 
as obvious before, is that through its path the sights of the analyst are never taken away from the 
specific social relations that underpin the various contradictory social forms. This is crucial for 
our study of Capital’s treatment of ideology. We come to see as we move from contradiction to 
contradiction that money, like the commodity, creates objective illusions because the money-
commodity’s status and roles do not reveal themselves to the economic agent’s eye as contingent 
on a specific set of social relations, relations that could be different from what they in fact are. 
Money appears to be the basic unit of social wealth because of the intrinsic qualities of this 
specific object, not because of the necessities of the socially-sustained law of value. (Recall the 
error of the Utopians and Proudhon.) Commodities appear to circulate because money circulates, 
when the circulation of money is only possible because the vast majority of the products of labor 
in market society take the form of commodities; being commodities, they are destined for 
exchange, not direct consumption. They take the form of commodities, moving backward, 
because the productive processes of society are segregated: the sum of all productive forces is 





thereby obtains a universal, abstract form. Et cetera. When the correspondence between forms 
(the “appearance”) and the social relations (the “essence”) behind them is well-established, their 
mystical character is revealed as such (though their appearance as mystical stays unchanged). 
This is what Marx is referring to when he declares his own work to be the first proper analysis of 
form in the sphere of economic activity. 
 
Part III: Capital, Labor-Power, and the Secret of Capitalist Accumulation 
 
 
“Value in Process,” Surplus-Value, and Labor-Power 
 
 We now come to an investigation into the origin of profit to conclude our exposition. The 
previous sections established a framework of production and distribution that seemingly 
excludes the very possibility of such a phenomenon. Market exchange, as we have seen, can only 
take place between commodities (including the money-commodity) that have the same value-
content. Yet, at the same time, we were led by the progression of the argument to take into 
consideration instances in which exchange-value is the “self-sufficient purpose” of circulation. 
The actual prevalence of exchange-value-directed economic activity in market societies, 
moreover, corroborates our suspicion that the model is missing a certain decisive component. If 
Marx’s analytical edifice is to truly grasp the “laws of motion” of the capitalist mode of 
production, then “the secret of profit-making must at last be laid bare.”115 
 
 We begin by scrutinizing the prototypical cycle of exchange that includes the expansion 
of exchange-value (M-C-[M + ΔM], henceforth M-C-M’). While our initial formula for exchange 
                                                        





started out with a value in a given commodity-form and ended with the same quantum of value 
in a different commodity-form, this new formula both commences and comes to a close with 
value in money-form. The amount of money, and thus the amount of exchange-value, received at 
the conclusion of the formula is greater than the amount that was thrown into circulation at the 
beginning: “One sum of money is distinguishable from another only by its amount… The 
process M-C-M[’] does not [] owe its content to any qualitative difference… but solely to 
quantitative changes.”116 Value, in apparent contradiction to the law of equivalent exchange, is 
therefore increased over the course of the cycle. The original sum of value, encapsulated in the 
term M, is complemented by an accretion, ΔM , styled by Marx as surplus-value. Value hence 
appears as “the dominant subject of a process in which… it changes its own magnitude, and thus 
valorizes itself independently.”117 Value is “dominant,” insofar as in this cycle value takes the 
form of commodities and the form of money in alternation in order to and only to complete the 
single-minded goal of its own self-expansion. In particular, money, by differing only 
quantitatively, serves the part of “an independent form by means of which [value’s] identity with 
itself [and its own valorization] may be asserted.”118 In M-C-M’, to sum up, value “suddenly 
presents itself as a self-moving substance which passes through a process of its own, and for 
which commodities and money are both mere forms.”119 We are dealing now, as Marx notes, 
with “value in process.” Seemingly by virtue of being value, value hurls itself into circulation, 
multiplies itself, and then reemerges, only to repeat the process again and again ad infinitum. In 
the minds of those it encounters in the various stages of its self-valorization, value “has acquired 
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the occult ability to add value to itself... or at least [lay] golden eggs.”120 There is, then, an 
objective illusion inherent to the cycle of M-C-M’ that even we, and Marx, are presently unable 
to decipher. 
 
 Marx affixes upon value in process (or “in motion”) the all-important title of capital. 
Capital, as such, is both the process of the self-valorization of value as well as the objective 
forms that value manifests itself as over the course of the process. Money that is advanced 
(rather than purely “spent”) to eventually return as more money is capital. Commodities that are 
bought and sold as part of the broader circuit are likewise capital. He or she who initiates the 
process by advancing a sum of money is, therefore, as capitalist, whose purpose in buying and 
selling is solely and fundamentally the unceasing accumulation of value (in the form of money): 
“Only in so far as the appropriation of every more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force 
behind his operations that he [or she] functions as capitalist, i.e. as capital personified and 
endowed with a consciousness and a will.”121 The capitalist does not step into marketplace in 
search of use-value, the acquisition of which is to be treated as merely instrumental for the 
securement of surplus-value. Nor is he or she motivated by a single, isolated instance of profit, 
but rather, as the personification of capital, by the “boundless” or limitless “drive for enrichment, 
this passionate chase after value.”122 Like the independent producer, buyer, seller, debtor, and 
creditor, the capitalist is the bearer (“Träger”) of a particular economic relation, in this case the 
relation created by value in process. With this addition to the picture, the contours of capitalist 
society start to come into view. 
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 Yet we are seemingly no closer to unearthing the source of surplus-value with these new 
categories than when we first identified the “general formula of capital.” As an upstanding 
citizen, the capitalist, too, abides by the law of equivalent exchange in his dealings in the market. 
Thus we continue to be deceived, along with the members of market society, by the illusion of 
value as a “Golden Chicken”; or, to engage with the illusion’s crudest and most superficial form, 
of money magically begetting money.123 To drive this point home, Marx pauses to berate a group 
of vulgar economists for reproducing the value/capital illusion point-blank, presenting a 
withering critique of their assertion that surplus-value is derived from exchange and from 
exchange alone (as appearances would have it).124 He does so by momentarily relaxing, as these 
economists do, the necessity for exchanges to be between equivalents: “In its pure form, the 
circulation process necessitates the exchange of equivalents, but in reality processes do not take 
place in their pure form. Let us therefore assume an exchange of non-equivalents.”125 We can 
imagine a seller that, through effective huckstering, manages to sell his or her commodities to a 
buyer for more than their value-content. Alternatively, we can conceive of a buyer that convinces 
a seller to alienate his or her products for less than their value-content. At first glance, this would 
explain how a greater amount of value can be withdrawn from circulation than what was first 
introduced. The central problem with these examples, as Marx points out, is that what constitutes 
a gain for either of these wily figures is chalked up as a loss for their unfortunate counterparts. 
The total amount of value in the system is unaffected by the clever maneuverings of a select few. 
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Merchant capital cannot, in short, be interpreted as a long-standing sequence of frauds. The 
surplus-value they manage must emanate from a different wellspring. 
 
 The only possible answer left for us to make sense of the capital circuit, consequently, is 
the existence on the market of a commodity the use-value of which is a source of value. That is, 
there must exist a commodity that, after being paid for in full, generates through productive 
consumption more value than it itself is worth. Since we know that value is defined by socially 
necessary labor time, Marx finally moves to the resolution of our conundrum: “The possessor of 
money does find such a special commodity on the market: the capacity for labor… labor-power 
[Arbeitskraft].”126 Labor-power is, for Marx, the ability of a human being to expend muscles, 
nerves, brain and the like in a given labor process. For labor-power to be a commodity, therefore, 
there must come into being a group of persons that are not only possess their ability to work as 
private property, but are also be willing to sell their “capacity for labor” for a definite period of 
time. As with any other commodity, labor-power has a value, which is equivalent to the socially 
necessary labor time necessary for its self-reproduction; here, the socially-necessary labor time 
needed by a possessor of labor-power to maintain him or herself in a state that permits him to 
once again return to the market and offer his labor-power for sale. This is “resolved into a value 
of a definite quantity of [] means of subsistence,” which include, alongside food, clothing, 
shelter, etc., the “special education or training” necessary to acquire the “skill[s] and dexterity” 
required in any given “branch of industry.”127 In general, the “number and extant” of the owner 
of labor-power’s “so-called necessary requirements… are themselves products of history,” as 
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needs evolve in the development of the productive forces of society.128 The value of labor-power 
thus depends on “moral” and historical determinants (a society’s “level of civilization”) that do 
not apply to other commodities. Marx nonetheless maintains that “in a given country at a given 
period,” the value is “a known datum.”129  
 
For the capitalist’s goal of value to be fulfilled, however, this datum, which is paid out in 
the form of a wage, must be below what he or she can extract from the owner of labor-power in a 
production process. Surplus-value is, then, a form of unpaid labor, labor time that is not included 
in the wage bill of the owner of labor-power. The mystery of profit is thereby solved. A capitalist 
advances a sum of money to purchase a quantity of labor-power and means (instruments and raw 
materials) of production. He or she then sets the labor-power to work with the means of 
production in a given productive cycle to produce commodities that contain more value than his 
original purchases. Finally, he brings these commodities, pregnant with surplus-value, to the 
market, selling them to realize a profit. The formula M-C-M’ is revealed to be an abbreviation of 
the complete formula M-C(LP, MP)… P … C’-M’, where LP stands for labor-power, MP means 
of production, P the productive cycle, and the apostrophes the surplus-value that is embedded in 
the commodities that emerge from the productive cycle.  
 
What we have elided in our description of labor-power, however, is that the very 
existence of labor-power as a commodity on the market has significant implications for our 
portrait of market society. Since “in and of itself, the exchange of commodities implies no other 
relations of dependence than those that result from its own nature,” which we have covered in 
                                                        






Parts I and II of this work, for a person to willingly offer their labor-power as a commodity 
implies that such a person, such a free worker, “instead of being able to sell commodities in 
which his [or her] labor has been objectified, must rather be compelled to offer for sale… that 
very labor-power which exists only in his [or her] living body.”130 A worker, in other words, has 
no avenue by which to produce value for him or herself than by serving as a commodity in the 
production process of a capitalist. He or she is bereft of the means of production by which he 
could “objectify” his or her labor, produce his or her own commodities, and by selling them earn 
a livelihood. His or her status as a free worker is thus a double-edged sword: “[The] worker must 
be free in the double sense that as a free individual he [or she] can dispose of his labor-power as 
his own commodity… [but] he [or she] is [also] free of all the objects needed for the realization 
of his labor-power.”131 
 
Our society of relatively equal independent producers has suddenly been transformed, 
through our solving of the puzzle of profit, into a class society, composed of owners of labor-
power, workers, and owners of money and means of production, capitalists. This class division is 
the expression of the exploitative social relation that we have unearthed, in which the laboring 
class is regularly bilked out of a portion of their value-product by the capitalist class. This 
essential relation of capitalist society, however, carries within itself a series of illusions that 
conceal its exploitative character. We shall finish our reconstruction of Marx’s narrative in the 
next section, in which we shall also come across one last, crucial illusion perpetuated by the 
structure of the marketplace. 
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The Illusion of the Marketplace as the Realm of “Freedom, Equality, Prop. and Bentham” 
 
Profit, that ubiquitous and defining feature of the capitalist mode of production, has been 
exposed through our analysis as the form of appearance taken on by labor time that is 
unindemnified. The mystical guise of the capital process (“value in motion”), as value (or 
money) that in occult fashion augments itself, actively obscures the origin of surplus-value in the 
exploitation of labor-power. The illusion nonetheless persists in spite of our legwork, as the 
participants in the world of commodity exchange continue to meet as equals, swapping 
equivalent for equivalent. We know that “the power which these persons exercise over each 
other is no other than the power of their commodities.”132 Yet in realm of circulation, one 
commodity is just as good as the other, provided that they import the same amount of objectified 
socially necessary labor time. Their owners recognize one another merely as bearers of private 
property, who freely dispose of their belongings so as to satisfy their privately-determined needs. 
The asymmetry in the positions of the capitalist and the worker is nowhere to be found in the 
marketplace, even though their ownership of money and means of production, on the one hand, 
and of the capacity to labor, on the other, establishes an acutely lopsided power structure, in 
which the latter must time and time again subordinate his or her will to the dictates of the former. 
The impartial point of original contact between the two gives no indication of the underlying 
class inequality that ultimately designates capitalism as synonymous with the exploitation of a 
large group of persons by a far less numerous one. 
 
The disingenuously harmonious characterization of capitalist relations of production 
fomented by the marketplace (which is, as should be also noted, the most visible and frequented 
                                                        





section of capitalist civil society) inevitably inspires grossly one-sided descriptions of the system 
that altogether miss the less pleasant class relation that lies at its core. Marx provides us with 
such a panegyric, one that could easily be mistaken as the pamphleteering of one of the vulgar 
economists he so cherishes belittling:  
 
The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of 
 labor-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of 
 Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us 
 say of labor-power, are determined only by their own free will. They contract as free persons, who are 
 equal before the law. Their contract is the final result in which their joint will finds a common legal 
 expression. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of 
 commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is 
 his [or her] own. And Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage. The only force bringing 
 them together, and putting them into relation with one another, is the selfishness, the gain and the private 
 interest of each. Each pays heed to himself only, and no one worries about the others. And precisely for that 
 reason, either in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an 
 omniscient providence [undoubtedly a reference to the “Invisible Hand”], they all work together to their 
 mutual advantage, for the common weal, and in the common interest.133 
 
As laden with irony as this passage may be, what is important and startling to note is that 
the description of the realm of exchange offered is nonetheless true. (“The sphere of 
circulation… is in fact a very Eden….”) The buyers and sellers that frolic in this “Eden” do not 
entirely delude themselves when they regard the free market as a center of de jure voluntary, 
equitable transactions that tend toward the ostensive benefit of all parties involved. This is how 
the arrangement actually appears (and is) to both the capitalist and the worker from the 
standpoint of mere commodity-ownership. What is passed over, of course, is that their freedom 
to truck, barter and exchange coexists with the “freedom in the double sense” of the worker, 
                                                        





whose “freedom” to sell his or her labor-power is, in fact, an obligation handed down by the 
silent compulsion of economic necessity; that the equality of their exchanges is belied by the 
“secret” that the “special commodity” of the worker shapes more value than what is received in 
return for its use; that the universal respect of property is predicated on the effective 
propertylessness of the worker; and that the utilitarian, “Benthamite” calculations on the part of 
the labor-directing capitalist invariably prioritize the accumulation of capital into private hands 
over the satisfaction of actual needs and wants of the worker and of society at large (the 
complete dislocation, on a societal scale, of use-value in favor of exchange-value).  
 
However, this feature of truth embedded in untruth is precisely what makes the objective 
illusions in Capital so pathological, this last one being perhaps the most egregious one we have 
dealt with. The illusions spring from the social world of capitalism and accurately describe the 
appearances of that world (or at least the subjective experience of that world), but only in such a 
way that the world’s actual foundations (capitalism’s particular, historically specific social 
relations) are kept out of sight and out of mind, given that the appearances themselves, as has 
been tirelessly stressed in this paper, are deceptive. They nudge the world’s inhabitants to do 
capital’s bidding without being truly conscious of what they are doing. Bringing back a quote 
from Marx’s discussion of the commodity fetish: “They do this without being aware of it. [Sie 
wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es.]”134 Even when they learn to discern the fraudulence of these 
appearances, the illusions linger. 
 
                                                        





 Before we move on to bring Marx’s argument to a close, I would like to briefly center our 
focus on one final example of an objective illusion that we are now properly equipped to probe: 
namely, the illusion of the wage-form. The illusory nature of the wage is best illustrated by once 
again engaging in a trans-historical comparison. In a slave society, the “wretched of the Earth” 
are painfully aware that the entirety of their labor is in the service of their masters. In feudal 
society, a serf is able to distinguish between the time during which he or she labors for him or 
herself and the time during which he or she labors for the sake of his or her landlord.135 In 
capitalist society, by contrast, a worker is unable to make this distinction, for the wage he or she 
receives bears no imprint of the surplus-value that was extracted from him or her over the course 
of the working day. The wage appears instead to be the full reward of a “hard day’s work” (or 
whatever time period the wage is meant to represent), when, in truth, the worker spends a portion 
of the laboring period reproducing the value of his or her labor-power and another lining the 
pockets of the capitalist who hired him or her. The wage, thus, is yet another necessary form of 
appearance that camouflages the exploitative nature of capitalist relations of production. The 
experience of this illusion, thus, attests once more to the opaqueness of capitalist society, 
especially when placed side by side with the more “transparent” economic structures of previous 
modes of production. We are reminded why the study of objective illusions is in part peculiar to 
the study and critique of capitalism. 
 
 We return to the last chapter of Marx’s story. We saw that in the marketplace, the owner 
of money and the owner of labor-power encountered one another simply as buyer and seller, 
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respectively. Once their contract is completed, however, and they travel into “the hidden abode 
of production,” the now-familiar conversion of buyer and seller to capitalist and worker takes 
place:  
 
 When we leave this sphere of simple circulation or the exchange of commodities… a certain change takes 
 place, or so it appears, in the physiognomy of the [buyer and seller]. He who was previously the money-
 owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the possessor of labor-power follows as his [or her] worker. 
 The one smirks self-importantly and is intent on business; the other is timid and holds back, like someone 
 who has brought his [or her] own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but – a tanning.136 
 
 The two now face each other in a relationship that is structurally antagonistic. The 
capitalist has a right to dispose of the commodities he or she purchases, including labor-power, 
as he or she sees fit. The worker has a right to preserve his or her commodity (his or her labor-
power) so that he or she may be able to suitably sell himself or herself again in the future. The 
capitalist has an incentive to do whatever is necessary to minimize the value of the worker’s 
labor-power or to maximize the surplus-value extracted from the worker, while the worker has 
an interest in demanding better treatment, better pay, etc. from the capitalist in order to ensure 
that his sole commodity comes out of the labor process intact (or improved). They are both, as 
commodity-owners, within their right to do so. The disagreement can only be resolved through 
blows, as “between equal rights, force decides.”137 Hence, the analysis that started with the 
contradictory dualism of the commodity comes to an end with class struggle, the natural outcome 
of the oppositional relation between capital and labor. 
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 This concludes the account that spans the first six chapters of Volume 1 of Capital. We 





 As is to be expected by this point, the final moments of the argument have a dialectical 
design. The contradiction between profit (non-equivalence) and the law of equivalent exchange 
finds a resolution in the form of labor-power as commodity. The introduction of labor-power as 
commodity broadens Marx’s picture considerably, adding to the plane of analysis wage-labor, 
capital accumulation, and class. In effect, the inclusion of labor-power as commodity morphs the 
                                                        





original, somewhat idyllic “market society,” composed of private, independent producers, into a 
capitalist society, in which the overarching aim of production is the extraction and amassment of 
surplus-value. This ties up the loose end that was created, in part, by the role of money as means 
of payment, as the cycle of capital accumulation demonstrates how exchange-value can act as 
“the self-sufficient purpose” of economic activity. Yet the transition from market society to 
capitalist society also obliges Marx to come to terms with a new fundamental economic relation 
between the owner of money and means of production and the owner of labor-power, a relation 
that is exploitative. This is what permits him to see through the illusion of value as a “self-
moving substance,” the illusion of the marketplace as the “Eden of the innate rights of man,” and 
the illusion of the wage-form as the full reward of labor. The tensions that have been present 
throughout the various stages of the argument in different forms finally culminate with the class-
based antagonism between capitalist and worker.  
 
What the method of Capital shows, then, is that this last antagonism was already 
contained in the starting point of the investigation, i.e. the commodity as the “elementary form” 
of society: 
 
In order to become a commodity, the product [of labor] must cease to be produced as the immediate means 
of subsistence of the producer himself. Had we gone further, and inquired under what circumstances all, or 
even the majority of products take the form of commodities, we should have found that this only happens 
on the basis of one particular mode of production, the capitalist one.139 
 
 As I suggested in Part I, however, we should resist the temptation of treating, as several 
commentators have done, this pathway from commodity to capital and labor as either a historical 
                                                        





account of the origin of the capitalist mode of production (which can be easily disproven, and 
Marx himself regards as ludicrous) or as a clean-cut deduction from a given set of premises to 
another set of logically necessary conclusions. The method consists instead of interrogating 
forms that exist in the world, asking under “what circumstances” (what social relations) they can 
exist, and using the results of such an examination – usually in the form of contradictions, 
oppositions or dualisms – to weave a gradually richer, more filled-in tapestry of the social world, 
with the analyst shuttling back and forth from the “realm of appearances” to the social 
substratum below. When applied to the capitalist mode of production, as we have seen, such a 
method allows the analyst to identify forms of appearance as illusory in the objective sense, for 





 What can we draw from our excursion into the first six chapters of Capital? 
 
 From the commodity fetish, to the mystification of the money-form, to the illusion of the 
marketplace, we see that even this relatively short snippet of Volume 1 is pregnant with a theory 
of structural self-concealment that is wholly different from the reductionist “false picture”/“false 
consciousness” paradigm so often attributed to Marx. No cabal of self-interested elites ever 
stepped into the frame to intentionally distort the judgments of the agents of production in 
market (and, later, capitalist) society. (Though, by Marx’s count, the vulgar economists have 
certainly tried their damnedest!) Rather, the positioning and types of activity of the agents 
themselves produced forms of appearance that seemed to take a life of their own, whether this 





mediating the patterns of production and exchange by virtue of their own physical qualities. As 
they did so, their origins as socially objective forms were papered over by claims to natural 
objectivity. The contingency and historicity of the capitalist mode of production and of the 
relations of production characterizing capitalist society likewise faded from view. Relationships 
between human beings were substituted by immortal relations between things, or, in the worst 
cases, their exploitative nature was noiselessly obfuscated so as to appear instead as expressions 
of individuality, independence, and freedom. 
 
 In the Introduction, I posited that the task of the social scientist in performing a critique 
of capitalist ideology (defined as I have in this work) was both to expose the forms of appearance 
as illusory and to explain what purpose their illusory character served. What became clear as we 
delved into the argument of Capital was that the objective illusions of market/capitalist society 
instill patterns of thought and behavior into the agents of production that are apt for the survival 
and maintenance of the economic system. They do so by naturalizing certain critical features of 
the system, habituating those carrying out their lives within its boundaries to its “way of doing 
things.” Their very existence is proof of the fact that we operate under a social structure that has 
“mastery” over us rather than vice-versa; that the conditions of our material mode of existence 
are largely not of our own choosing. In losing its appearance as a socially constructed entity, the 
capitalist mode of production instead appears as permanent and inevitable, or, if taken to be the 
natural fulfilment of elemental human characteristics (“a very Eden of the innate rights of man”), 
as the “best of all possible worlds.” The political and social imaginary is narrowed and contorted 
to accept the impossibility of any alternative. Even if troubled by the persistence of poverty, 





person captivated by the illusions can shrug his or her shoulders and resign him or herself to the 
conclusion that the social world that is is the social world that has to be, at least in its basic 
design. This is not unlike the countless number of astronomers, mathematicians, and theologians 
who for centuries could point to the apparent movement of the Sun in the sky as irrefutable 
evidence of a geocentric view of the universe. From where we stand, we undeniably perceive the 
Sun, and not the Earth, to be the traveling celestial entity, and similarly to the objective illusions 
of capitalism or the Kantian transcendental illusions, the mere knowledge that the Earth is, in 
fact, revolving around the Sun and not the other way around does not alter that mistaken 
perception. (Recall as vaguely analogous to this example the illusion, explored in Part II, which 
holds that commodities circulate because money circulates, when the reality is that the latter 
circulates because the former does.) Yet unlike our impression of the Sun’s movement, or the 
illusions engendered by the “fundamental rules and maxims” of the faculty of reasoning, the 
objective illusions Marx highlights in Capital can ultimately be changed, for they are the result 
of our own collective actions. 
 
 The other prominent claim that I made in the Introduction, which justified my retelling of 
Marx’s narrative, was that the methodology of Capital was uniquely suited to root out these 
illusions and reveal the unreliability of appearances in capitalist society. My success on this front 
will have to be evaluated by how convincing we consider the dialectical progression from 
commodity to capital and labor to be. Nonetheless, I take it as a matter of no small consequence 
that throughout the entire progression Marx’s lenses are focused on the relational traits of the 
categories and forms he works with: how they interact with one another, how they come into 





have a plane of analysis unfold from the movement of contradictions, dualities, etc. seems prima 
facie to be particularly fecund, although whether he is actually consistent with his definition of 
“contradiction” is matter that is certainly up for debate. 
 
 I will now bring this thesis to a close by reminding the reader that I have only covered a 
fraction of the three Volumes of Capital, largely due to spatial and thematic concerns. The 
instances of objective illusions or of fetishes that I have pointed out in the first six chapters of the 
first Volume are only a small sample of the total that Marx uncovers over the course of his 
investigation. There are incredibly complex illusions, such as the “Trinity Formula” that I 
referenced at the start of this paper, that incorporate the results of all three Volumes, portraying a 
“bewitched, distorted and upside-down world haunted by Monsieur le Capital and Madame la 
Terre, who are at the same time social characters and mere things.”140 My goal, however, was 
only to show that such a theory of ideology was present in Capital, to explain its problematic 
through concrete examples, and to demonstrate the capacity of Marx’s method to provide a 
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